Touro Law Review
Volume 13

Number 3

Article 33

1997

Right to Trial by Jury, Court of Appeals People v. Foy

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
(1997) "Right to Trial by Jury, Court of Appeals People v. Foy," Touro Law Review: Vol. 13: No. 3, Article 33.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/33

This New York State Constitutional Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @
Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

RIGHT TO TRIAL BY
et al.:JURY
Jury Trial
N.Y CoNsT. art. I, § 8:
Trial by jury is guaranteed as provided in article one of this
constitution. The legislature may provide that in any court of
originaljurisdictiona jury shall be composed of six or of twelve
persons and may authorize any court which shall have
jurisdiction over crimes and other violations of law, other than
crimes prosecuted by indictment, to try such matters without a
jury, provided, however, that crimes prosecuted by indictment
shall be tried by a jury composed of twelve persons, unless a jutry
trial has been waived as provided in section two of article one of
this constitution.
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Foy'
(decided October 17, 1996)
Defendant, Edward Foy, was charged with multiple petty
2
offenses in a joined trial in relation to two separate altercations.
Foy was convicted only of a single violation which carried a
maximum punishment of fifteen days imprisonment. 3 After a
bench trial, the defendant was sentenced to a conditional
discharge. 4 Foy appealed and claimed that he was entitled to a
jury trial under the Federal5 and New York State 6 Constitutions
because the maximum aggregate sentence for the multiple
7
offenses charged was in excess of six months imprisonment.
1.
2.
3.
4.

88 N.Y.2d 742, 673 N.E.2d 589, 650 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1996).
Id.
Id. at 744, 673 N.E.2d at 591, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
Id. at 743, 673 N.E.2d at 590, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 80.

5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a...
trial, by an impartial jury. ... " Id.
6. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2. This section provides in pertinent part:
"Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by
constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever ... ." Id.
7. Foy, 88 N.Y.2d at 745, 673 N.E.2d at 591, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
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The Appellate Term affirmed the judgment of the Criminal Court
and held that the defendant was not constitutionally entitled to a
jury trial because each offense was considered "petty" within the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment and therefore, would not have
been triable before a jury if prosecuted individually. 8 The New
York State Court of Appeals affirmed and held that the
determination of whether a defendant is entitled to a jury trial
depends on the seriousness of the offense, and "not the potential
aggregate sentence for a series of petty offenses that may be
consolidated for trial." 9
Edward Foy was originally charged, under two separate
informations, with multiple misdemeanors and lesser offenses
relating to two altercations with his wife which occurred more
than one week apart. 10 At the time of trial, the charges on the
first information were two class B misdemeanors, 11 each of
12
which carried a maximum authorized jail term of three months.
The second information was reduced to three class B
misdemeanors, 13 and a single count of harassment. 14 The

8. People v. Foy, 166 Misc. 2d 358, 359-61, 636 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560
(1st Dep't 1995). See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 340.40(2) (McKinney
1994). This section codified the rule that an offense is "petty" when the
authorized prison term is six months or less. The section provides in pertinent
part:
In any local criminal court a defendant who has entered a plea of not

guilty to an information which charges a misdemeanor must be accorded
a jury trial except that in New York city criminal court, the trial of an
information which charges a misdemeanor for which the authorized
term of imprisonment is not more than six months must be a single
judge trial ....
Id.
9. Foy, 88 N.Y.2d at 745, 673 N.E.2d at 591, 650 N.Y,6.2d at 81.
10. Foy, 166 Misc. 2d at 359, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
11. Id. at 359, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 560. Defendant was charged with
"attempted criminal mischief in the fourth degree" (Penal Law §§ 110.00.
145.00[1]), and "menacing in the third degree" (Penal Law § 120.15).
Id.
12. Id. at 359, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 560 (citing Penal Law § 70.15 [2]).
13. Id. Defendant was charged with "attempted third degree assault"
(Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.00 [11), "attempted fourth degree criminal
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prosecution made a motion to consolidate the informations for
trial for reasons of administrative convenience. 1 5

Although the

defendant conceded that each count was equivalent to a "petty"
offense within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment and
therefore not triable by a jury if individually prosecuted, he
nonetheless argued that a jury trial was warranted because if he
were convicted of all the offenses charged, he conceivably could

receive a jail term in excess of six months. 16 The court rejected
the defendant's proposed "aggregate sentence approach" and held
that the seriousness of the offense was the central point of
inquiry, not the "sheer number of accumulated offenses tried on a
17
given day or on a given accusatory instrument."
In its analysis, the New York State Court of Appeals

recognized that offenses that warrant a jail term of greater than
six months are classified as "serious" and thus afford a defendant
a New York and United States constitutional right to a jury

trial. 18

Conversely, offenses with sentences of less than six

mischief" (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 145.00 [1]), and "attempted second degree
criminal contempt" (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 215.50 [3]). Id.
14. Id. The charge is now designated "harassment in the second degree"
and renumbered Penal Law § 240.26, a "violation punishable by a maximum
sentence of 15 days" (Penal Law § 70.15 [4])." Id.
15. Id. at 360, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 560. "The administrative convenience of
litigating these multiple charges in one trial did not serve to enhance the
ultimate risk faced by the defendant or to somehow transform the 'petty'
offenses alleged to the level of a 'serious' crime" Id. [citations omitted].
16. Foy, 166 Misc.2d at 359-60, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
17. Id. at 360, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 560. The criminal court determined that
since the two informations consolidated for the joint trial involved two separate
incidents, each of which carried a potential sentence of less than six months,
there was no constitutional right to a jury trial. Fo, 88 N.Y.2d at 744. 673
N.E.2d at 591, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
18. Foy, 88 N.Y.2d at 745, 673 N.E.2d at 591, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 81. See
also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-62 (1968). The penalty
authorized for a particular offense is the relevant factor in determining whether
an offense should be classified as either "serious" or "petty." Duncan, 391
U.S. at 159. In Duncan, appellant was convicted of the offense of "simple
battery" which carried a possible punishment of up to two years imprisonment
and a $300.00 fine. Id. at 146. Although Duncan was sentenced to serve only
60 days in the parish prison and pay a $150.00 fine, the Court found that
because of the punishment that could have been imposed, such offense should
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months are "petty" offenses, and are not afforded the right to a
jury trial. 19 The court emphasized that offenses are to be
examined "individually and separately" to determine whether the
legislature has classified the offense as "serious." ' 20 Thus, if a
court determines that the offense is not "serious," the defendant
21
is not entitled to a trial by jury.
In Baldwin v. New York, 22 the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed appellants conviction and held that the possibility
of a one year prison sentence was enough in itself to warrant a
jury trial. 23 The Court found that "no offense cfould] be deemed
'petty' for purposes of the right to trial by jury, where
' 24
imprisonment for more than six months [wa]s authorized."
Furthermore, the Court recognized that although a prison
sentence of less than six months may not seem like a "petty"
matter to an accused, that type of inconvenience is outweighed by
the advantages of a "speedy and inexpensive nonjury
adjudication.

"25

be classified as "serious" and not "petty" and therefore appellant was entitled
to a jury trial. Id. at 161-62 (emphasis added).
19. Foy, 88 N.Y.2d at 745, 673 N.E.2d at 591, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 81
(citations omitted). "[P]etty offenses may be prosecuted in State court without
a jury." People v. Foy, 166 Misc. 2d 358, 359 (1995) (citing Duncan, 391
U.S. at 161-62).
20. Foy, 88 N.Y.2d at 745, 673 N.E.2d at 591, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 81.

21. Id. at 745, 673 N.E.2d at 592, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 82 (emphasis added).
22. 399 U.S. 66 (1969).
23. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 69. In Baldwin, appellant was charged with a
Class A misdemeanor in New York City Criminal Court and was subject to
punishment of up to one year imprisonment. Id. at 67. Appellant asserted that

the applicable New York statute was unconstitutional insofar as it denied him
his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. Id. at 68. The Court agreed.
Id. The statute provides in part:
all trials in the court shall be without a jury . . .all trials . . .shall be
held before a single judge; provided, however, that where the defendant
has been charged with a misdemeanor. . .[he] shall be advised that he
has the right to a trial ... held by a panel of three of the judges thereof

Id. at 67 n.2 (quoting N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Act § 40 (Supp. 1969)).
24. Id. at 69.
25. Id. at 73.
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Recently, in Lewis v. United States,26 the Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether a defendant has the
constitutional right to a jury trial when the aggregate prison term
for multiple petty offenses charged in a single proceeding exceeds
six months. 27 In Lewis, the defendant was charged with two
Each charge carried a
counts of obstructing the mail. 28
maximum authorized prison sentence of six months.
Interestingly, the magistrate denied the defendant's request for a
jury trial reasoning that she "would not sentence him to more
than six months imprisonment," and ordered a bench trial. 29
In rejecting the defendant's Sixth Amendment argument, the
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment only reserves a
jury-trial right to defendants that are accused of serious
offenses. 30 The determination is made by looking to the intent of
the legislature in their expression of the maximum term of
imprisonment for the offense. 3 1 The Court stated that "[t]he fact
that the petitioner was charged with two counts of a petty offense
does not revise the legislative judgment as to the gravity of that
particular offense, nor does it transform the petty offense into a
32
serious one to which the jury-trial right would apply."
Furthermore, the Court reiterated that when the legislature
determines that an offense is "petty," the potential prison term
faced by a particulardefendant who is charged with more than
one such petty offense is irrelevant. 33 Because it was determined
that the right to a jury trial did not exist, the Court never reached
the question of "whether a judge's self-imposed limitation on
sentencing could affect the right to a jury trial. "34

26. 116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996).
27. Id. at 2164.

28. Id. at 2165. Defendant, Lewis, was a mail handler who, while under
observation by postal inspectors, opened mail and removed currency. Id.
29. Id.

30. Id. at 2167.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2168.
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In Morgenthau v. Erlbaum,35 the respondent was a New York
City Criminal Court Judge, and the petitioner was the District
Attorney who was seeking a declaratory judgment to attack
respondent's interlocutory criminal court ruling.36 The case
arose when two women, accused of prostitution, moved for a
jury trial. 37 Each offense carried a three-month maximum jail
sentence. 38 The defendants claimed that New York Criminal
Procedure Law [hereinafter CPL] section 340.40(2) 39 was
unconstitutional because it deprived them of their right to a jury
trial as guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment. 40 In granting the
defendants' motion, the court reasoned that notwithstanding the
minor sentences that could be imposed, the crime of prostitution
is of itself a "serious" crime and therefore comes within the
purview of the Sixth Amendment. 4 1 The New York State Court
of Appeals ruled that CPL section 340.40(2), as applied to
prostitution charges, was not violative of the Sixth
Amendment. 42 In so ruling, the Court recognized that
prostitution is a "petty" offense, as evidenced by its maximum
length of incarceration. 43 The Court stated that "[a]lthough
earlier cases may have considered various factors of a crime...
recent Supreme Court decisions have emphasized the length of
sentence to the exclusion of virtually everything else." 44
In support of his argument to adopt the "aggregate-sentence
approach," Foy relied on Codispoti v. Pennsylvania.45 In
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
months
40.
394.
41.
42.

59 N.Y.2d 143, 451 N.E.2d 150, 464 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1983).
Id. at 146, 451 N.E.2d at 151-52, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 393-94.
Id. at 146, 451 N.E.2d at 152, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
Id. at 154, 451 N.E.2d at 154, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
See infra note 8 (directing that crimes punishable by not more than six
imprisonment must be heard by a single judge).
Morgenthau, 59 N.Y.2d at 146, 451 N.E.2d at 152, 464 N.Y.S.2d at

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 154, 451 N.E.2d at 156, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
43. Id. ("The penalty is deemed of major relevance ...... ") Id. at 153,
451 N.E.2d at 156, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
44. Id. at 153, 451 N.E.2d at 156, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 398 (citations
omitted).
45. Foy, 88 N.Y.2d at 747, 673 N.E.2d at 592, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
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Codispoti,46 the defendant was charged and convicted of several
counts of criminal contempt, and was denied his demand for a
48
jury trial. 47 Codispoti's demand for a jury trial was denied.
The lower courts found that since no term of imprisonment in
excess of six months was imposed for any single offense, the
petitioners were not entitled to a jury trial. 49 In its analysis, the
Supreme Court recognized that, while judgment of the
seriousness of a crime is normally determined by the Legislature,
here the Legislature had remained silent as to a penalty for
criminal contempt and as such, the Court determined that "[t]he
pettiness or seriousness of the contempt will be judged by the
penalty actually imposed." 50 Therefore, in terms of the sentence
imposed on Codispoti, the Court found that the defendant was
"tried for what was equivalent to a serious offense and was
entitled to a jury trial." 5 1 Consequently in Foy, the Legislature
did not remain silent as to the penalties for the multiple petty
crimes with which Foy was charged. Moreover, the court noted
that "[m]ultiple petty crimes remain 'petty' by legislative
classification and their nature, and are not transformed by their
52
sheer number alone into matters of a serious level and nature."
Foy's argument also failed under Lewis. 53 Lewis limited the
46. 418 U.S. 506 (1974).

47. Id. at 507-08. Defendant was convicted of seven counts of contempt
and sentenced to six months inprison for each of the six counts and three
months in prison for the seventh count. Id. at 509.
48. Id. at 508.

49. Id. at 510.
50. Id. at 511.

51. Id. at 517. "IT]he salient fact remains that the contempts arose from a
single trial, were charged by a single judge, and were tried ina single
proceeding. The individual sentences imposed were then aggregated, one
sentence taking account of the others and not beginning until the immediately
preceding sentence had expired." Id.
52. Foy, 88 N.Y.2d at 747, 673 N.E.2d at 593, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
53. See ifra notes 25-33. Lewis was charged with two petty offenses.
each with a maximum authorized prison sentence of six months, which did not
warrant a jury trial. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2167. The Lewis Court further
explained that the intent of the legislature in their expression of the maximum
term of imprisonment of a single offense prevails, and their judgment is what
determines whether an offense is or is not serious. Id. It is of no consequence
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rationale of Codispoti when it recognized that a court "[n]eed not
look to the punishment actually imposed, [when the court is] able
54
to discern Congress' judgment of the character of the offense."
In sum, Foy's aggregate sentence approach failed. The basis
for the court's rationale was its analysis of the severity of the
offense. That severity is, in effect, determined by the Legislature
It is believed that those
in its punishment classification.
prosecuted for "serious" offenses, i.e. greater than six months
imprisonment, have a greater exposition to the deprivation of
liberty and therefore, the inalienable guarantee deeply rooted in
both the Federal and State Constitutions is to provide for a trial
by jury. 55 It was along that line of reasoning that the court
firmly dismissed the allegation that the offenses were
consolidated solely for efficiency reasons. 56 The emphasis, the
Court explained, is on the examination of each offense
individually and separately and not an aggregation of the

sentences promulgated as petty offenses. 57 Therefore, in order
for a defendant to invoke the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial, he or she must first have been charged with at least a single
offense that has been legislatively qualified as "serious."
58

People v. Knowles
(decided October 22, 1996)
The defendant, Newton Knowles, claimed that his right to
counsel was violated under the Federal 59 and State
that a defendant has been charged with multiple counts of a petty offense
because the legislature has already determined the gravity and appropriate

punishment for that offense. Id.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 2168.
Foy, 88 N.Y.2d at 747, 673 N.E.2d at 593, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
Id. at 747, 673 N.E.2d at 593, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
Id. at 745, 673 N.E.2d at 591, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 81 (emphasis added).
88 N.Y.2d 763, 673 N.E.2d 902, 650 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1996).

59. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense." Id.
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